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Abstract 
 
Regional integration scores alluringly high on the hit list of the most promising cures 
for the world’s major problems. Undoubtedly, the European Union has considerable 
experience in developing a sophisticated regional integration scheme – but does it 
possess the ‘magic formula’ for fostering integration in other parts of the world? This 
paper asks how and why the European Union promotes regional economic 
integration in its neighbourhood and to what extent it is successful. We argue that as 
a ‘normative power’ the EU aims both at exporting its norms and values and at 
increasing its security by stabilising its neighbourhood. We assess the EU’s success in 
promoting the regional trade agreements located in the Western Balkans (CEFTA 
2006) and the Mediterranean (Agadir Agreement). The findings of these two case 
studies show that the EU pursues different political objectives with its support on a 
general political level as well as through concrete financial and technical assistance 
programmes. Although the existence of an EU membership perspective has an 
influence, the Union is not necessarily more successful in promoting regional 
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1. Introduction: Regional Economic Integration as a ‘Magic Formula’? 
Regional integration scores alluringly high on the hit list of the most promising 
panaceas for the world’s major problems. If successful, it is expected to transform 
political adversaries into cooperating allies or even security communities, thereby 
reducing the instances of raw power politics of modern states and contributing to 
civilised, post-modern patterns of interactions. Hopes for intra-regional trade, 
competitiveness and modernisation of economies are put in regional economic 
integration, enabling whole regions to rush upwards on the ladder of development. 
Moreover, positive experiences with regional economic integration in the form of 
regional trade agreements (RTAs)1 encourage multilateral liberalisation in so-called 
‘deep integration’ issues such as the creation of common rules for foreign 
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement and competition. 
A further convenient feature of regional integration is that it also benefits external 
actors’ security when it leads to the reduction of development and prosperity gaps 
and to more cooperative behaviour. 
 
The fact that the European Union (EU) appears to be the only example of 
mature regional integration to date illustrates, however, the importance of the 
qualifying words “if successful”. Indeed, most of the literature on regional integration 
focuses on the identification of conditions and recommendations for success, often 
taking the EU as point of reference. Still somewhat neglected is the aspect of the 
promotion of regional integration by external actors.2 Undoubtedly, the EU has 
considerable experience in developing a sophisticated regional integration scheme 
but does it also know the magic formula for fostering integration in other parts of the 
world? The promotion of regional integration is becoming a significant tool for the EU 
                                                 
1 RTAs are trade agreements concluded between two or more countries within a region to 
reduce tariffs and/or other restrictions on trade while the underlying intentions are often of a 
political nature. See F. Söderbaum & L. van Langenhove, ‘Introduction: The EU as a Global 
Actor and the Role of Interregionalism’, in F. Söderbaum & L. van Langenhove (eds.), The EU 
as a Global Actor: The Politics of Interregionalism, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 7. For an 
overview on recent theories and debates, see A. Willenberg, ‘The Promotion of Regional 
Economic Integration in the EU’s Neighbourhood’, Master’s thesis presented at the College of 
Europe, Bruges, May 2009, pp. 4-6.  
2 Called “region-building from outside” by Karen E. Smith, ‘The EU and Central and Eastern 
Europe: The Absence of Interregionalism’, in F. Söderbaum & L. van Langenhove (eds.), The 
EU as a Global Actor: The Politics of Interregionalism, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 100. 
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to realise its foreign policy objectives (some authors even call it the EU’s new ‘foreign 
policy doctrine’3).  
 
The region whose stability and prosperity most immediately affects the EU’s 
security is its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood,4 where ‘a ring of friends’ is to be 
created. To prevent this ring from breaking, strong bonds connecting the individual 
parts must be formed. Accordingly, the EU seeks to foster regional integration among 
the individual neighbouring countries, complementary to the bilateral relations. While 
this encompasses also political and cultural regional cooperation, this work focuses 
on the promotion of regional economic integration by the EU in its neighbourhood. 
The EU’s own starting point was economic cooperation with an overarching political 
motivation to prevent further violent conflicts on the European continent. 
Correspondingly, there is hope that successful economic cooperation can lead to 
the reduction of political tensions and increased cooperative behaviour also in other 
regions. This would also offer investment and export opportunities for European 
companies and contribute to the spread of EU norms and standards in the context of 
competition for becoming the global regulatory capital. Moreover, the EU as 
‘normative power’ exports its core norms through different mechanisms, one of them 
being its trade policy.  
 
The objective of this work is to illustrate the motivations for the EU’s support for 
regional economic integration in its neighbourhood, to analyse which instruments it 
uses and to assess if the EU is successful in this endeavour. In other words, how and 
why does the EU promote regional economic integration in its neighbourhood and to 
what extent is it successful? To answer this question, we will analyse and compare EU 
support to two regional trade agreements: the ‘new’ Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) 2006 and the Agadir Agreement, both in force since 2007. CEFTA 
2006 comprises eight countries of the Western Balkans5 and foresees free trade in all 
industrial and most agricultural products; includes modern provisions on trade related 
issues and evolutionary clauses on trade-related issues, mechanisms for 
implementation and dispute settlement; and envisages harmonisation with the EU 
                                                 
3 F. Söderbaum & L. van Langenhove, op.cit., p. 2. 
4 The term ‘neighbourhood’ here refers to both the (potential) candidate countries and the 
countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
5 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK/Kosovo. 
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acquis  in many areas. Except for Moldova, the participants of CEFTA 2006 are 
(potential) candidate countries for accession to the EU and take part in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) preparing them for future accession. With 
the Central and Eastern European enlargement of 2004/07, regional integration has 
become a pre-condition for accession to the EU. In contrast, the participants of the 
Agadir Agreement (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) do not have an accession 
perspective; their relations to the EU are governed through the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). While CEFTA 2006 is a comprehensive RTA in that it covers all 
Western Balkan countries and has a member even from beyond that region, only 
four out of the eleven Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs)6 are 
members of the Agadir Agreement. It aims at the establishment of an Arab 
Mediterranean free trade zone as required for the creation of a broader Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area (FTA) foreseen in the EMP, while liberalisation in 
agricultural goods and services proceeds according to broader liberalisation 
agreements – the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and GATS.  
 
Both RTAs have in common that they receive general political and specific 
financial and technical EU support. The EU has also been actively involved in the 
creation of the two RTAs. The most striking difference between the two cases is the 
issue of an EU membership perspective. The ‘carrot’ of an accession perspective is 
often mentioned as the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tool. In this work, one 
question to be answered is whether the EU can also successfully promote regional 
economic integration when the carrot ‘only’ consists of increased (economic) 
integration with the Single Market, such as through the Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade area. This is of relevance also to regions located beyond the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood as it influences whether the EU should continue its current path 
towards fostering regional integration or concentrate on alternative foreign policy 
tools.  
 
Our analysis will first establish a framework of analysis for the two cases, that is 
for the identification of the EU’s objectives and the evaluation of the instruments 
used. While it is not the main aim of this work, we provide an evaluation of the RTAs 
as such to the extent necessary for the subsequent assessment of the EU’s promotion 
                                                 
6 These are currently Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia.  
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efforts. From these results, we can then deduce a general condition for the EU to be 
successful in the promotion regional economic integration.  
 
2. Framework of Analysis 
This section sets out an analytical framework to assess the economic and political 
effects of RTAs and the EU’s influence as a norm exporter.  
 
2.1 Regional Economic Integration 
As a first step, we establish criteria to identify the economic effects of the regional 
integration schemes by analysing to what extent overall economic change 
occurred after the creation of the RTA – looking at economic growth, growth in intra-
regional trade and export-led growth, increase in inflows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) – and by comparing the provisions of the RTAs (i.e. we check whether and how 
traditional liberalisation issues, new trade issues, operating rules, contingent 
protection and dispute settlement and exceptions to the agreement are covered). 
 
To assess the political effects of the RTAs, we establish two broad categories. 
The first category, ‘practice international cooperation’, includes the creation of 
interdependence and solidarity, the increase in cooperative behaviour and 
reduced tensions among the participants.7 We use the existence of institutionalised, 
regular meetings as an indicator and analyse relevant documents. The underlying 
mechanism is one of socialisation processes, that is through regular and 
institutionalised interaction actors develop trust and are increasingly willing to make 
concessions in recurrent bargaining. While these aspects focus on the 
intergovernmental nature of regional integration, we use the establishment of 
supranational institutions by the RTA as an indicator for the practice of delegation of 
sovereignty. We further expect increased local ownership and commitment to be a 
political effect, depending on economic benefits from the RTA (indicated by the 
level of public funding available at regional level8). Increasing local ownership and 
commitment can be assumed when parties take on more financial responsibility for 
                                                 
7 G. Bertrand, at the time representing the European Commission, at a conference on 
subregional integration in Bucharest in October 1996, referred to in M. Dangerfield, 
‘Subregional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: Support or Substitute for the “Return 
t o  E u r o p e ” ? ’ ,  i n  C .  R o s s  ( e d . ) ,  Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union, 
Leiden, Brill, 2002, p. 98.  
8 For details on this reasoning, see Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in 
Regional Organization, Boston, University Press of America, 1987 (1971), pp. 31, 38.  
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regional-level institutions. The second category is ‘training ground for EU 
membership’, implying that through acquiring practice on regular, institutionalised 
cooperation, the partly adoption of the acquis and interaction with the EU through 
its support measures, the participants in an RTA are better prepared for EU 
membership. We assess this category mainly on the basis of interviews conducted 
with Commission officials and official documents. 
 
2.2 The EU as a Norm Exporter 
The basis for the EU’s influence in RTAs can be accession conditionality. Although 
only one Western Balkan country, Croatia, is currently negotiating membership, the 
others ‘voluntarily’ adhere to EU conditions to smooth the path to accession. As 
stated by Commissioner Rehn, “[e]nlargement is a matter of extending the zone of 
European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance 
and human rights, democracy and the rule of law”.9 As regards countries without 
accession perspective, the EU has a preference for using ‘carrots’ (or incentives) and 
not ‘sticks’. As O’Brennan notes, the “process of diffusion can only be implemented 
with the voluntary acceptance of these norms by outside states”.10 The political will 
of the RTA’s participants is thus not only an important factor influencing the success 
of an RTA as such, but also the success of external actors’ efforts to promote regional 
integration.11  
 
To analyse to what extent the EU is successful in its promotion of RTAs, we first 
establish the general EU objectives and see if they are achieved. We thereby 
distinguish between foreign policy objectives (i.e. preparation for accession or 
increased security through further integration with the EU) and economic objectives. 
The assessment here builds on the results of the political effects of the integration 
scheme as such. As regards the economic objectives, we use four explanatory 
factors for the EU’s trade policy established by Guerrieri & Caratelli (commercial 
diplomacy, development objectives, hub-and-spoke regulatory power and 
                                                 
9 O. Rehn, ‘Values Define Europe, not Borders’, Financial Times, 4 January 2005, retrieved 19 
April 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/pdf/statements/rehn_ft_european_ 
values_en.pdf. 
10 J. O’Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 
160.  
11 For an elaboration of Ian Manner’s concept of the EU as a ‘normative power’ see A. 
Willenberg, op.cit., pp. 8-10. At this point, we limit ourselves to the EU’s treaty basis which 
refers to fundamental values (Art. 6 TEU, Art. 11 TEU, Art. 40 TEC).  
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competition objectives12). We use the findings of the assessment of the economic 
effects of the RTAs as such as starting point. In a second step, we identify the specific 
objectives the EU pursues with support programmes carried out by the Commission to 
the two RTAs and analyse whether they have been achieved.  
 
3. Case I: CEFTA 2006 
The EU, in particular the Commission’s DG Trade, was the “main partner”13 of the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) in creating CEFTA 2006 in the early 
2000s. The institutional structure consists of a Joint Committee14 (composed of 
ministers responsible for trade issues), its sub organs such as the sub-committees on 
agriculture, on customs and on non-tariff barriers to trade, and a permanent 
secretariat located in Brussels.15 
 
3.1 EU Support for CEFTA 2006 – Objectives and Instruments 
One mechanism to prepare the Western Balkan countries for EU membership is 
regional economic integration, implying that CEFTA 2006 can be perceived as “an 
important economic means to a major political end”.16 Further objectives are 
increased competitiveness as called for by the Copenhagen criteria and 
consequently a reduction in the costs of accession for the old EU Member States. 
Moreover, Western Balkan countries are expected to progressively adopt EU norms 
and standards, offer market access and investment opportunities for EU companies. 
The objective of competition seems to be not of immediate concern anymore as the 
decision to integrate into EU structures (and not, for example, to pursue integration 
with Russia) has been largely taken.  
 
The EU supports CEFTA 2006 both through general support, for instance 
illustrated by the Commission’s involvement in its creation and the presence of high-
                                                 
12 Guerreri and Caratelli include ‘foreign policy objectives’ as fifth motivation for trade policy. 
P. Guerrieri & I. Caratelli, ‘EU’s Regional Trade Strategy: The Challenges Ahead’, The 
International Trade Journal, vol. 20, no. 2, 2006, pp. 139-184. For details on the adjustment of 
their model to the EU’s involvement in RTAs, see A. Willenberg, op.cit., pp. 9-10.  
13 E. Busek, Special Co-ordinator Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, ‘Opening Remarks, 
CEFTA 2006 Joint Committee Meeting’, Ohrid, 28 September 2007. 
14 CEFTA Chairmanship of Montenegro 2009, ‘CEFTA 2006 Joint Committee’, retrieved 27 April 
2009, http://www.cefta2006.com/Zajednicki-komitet/en-Z_komitet.html. 
15 CEFTA Chairmanship of Montenegro 2009, ‘CEFTA 2006’, retrieved 27 April 2009, 
http://www.cefta2006.com/en-index.php. 
16 P.M. Wijkman, ‘A Reader’s Guide to “CEFTA 2006”’, presentation on Expanding Trade and 
Investment in South Eastern Europe, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Brussels, 18-21 April 2007, p. 7.  
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level officials in key events,17 and through financial and technical assistance in the 
framework of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).18 EU funding is 
provided for the CEFTA Secretariat and for technical assistance to the participating 
countries (e.g. for training seminars).19 As for any component of IPA funding, rather 
vague expected results are stated in the programming documents. Measurable 
indicators are set up in the Commission’s Standard Summary Project Fiche on the 
Regional Programme on Trade and Investment in the Western Balkans.20 The overall 
political motivation behind the support for CEFTA 2006 is illustrated by the inclusion of 
the support programme in the first priority axis (‘political criteria’) of the multi-
beneficiary programme for 2008.21 
 
3.2 Assessment 
3.2.1 Effects of CEFTA 2006 as Such 
As CEFTA 2006 entered into force only in 2007, it is not possible yet to draw overall 
conclusions as regards the economic and political effects of the RTA. Nevertheless, 
there are promising signs. Representatives from several participating countries stated 
that their trade with CEFTA partners had increased.22 Unlike these optimistic official 
statements, there is criticism from business. Expectations have been high, but to 
date, many companies are disappointed about the increase in administrative 
procedures mainly related to rules of origin (RoOs). Also, there is a feeling that Serbia 
and Croatia keep exemptions from tariff eliminations out of protectionist 
motivations.23 In general, economic growth increased in all countries, except for 
Moldova, from 2006 to 2007.24 Also total exports and imports of goods and services 
                                                 
17 Such as the Commissioners for enlargement and trade and Presidents of the European 
Council. See SPSEE, Press Release, 6 April 2006, retrieved 5 March 2009, 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/pages/press/detail.asp?y=2006&p=308. 
18 For details on the programming documents, see A. Willenberg, op.cit., pp. 17-18.  
19 Commission, Commission Decision establishing a Multi-Beneficiary Multi-annual Indicative 
Planning Document (MIPD) 2008-2010, p. 17.  
20 Commission, Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA centralised programmes, Regional 
Programme on Trade and Investment in the Western Balkans, 2008, p. 4. 
21 Commission, Commission Decision adopting the Multi-Beneficiary Programme 2a under the 
IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component for the year 2008, C(2008)8472, 
Brussels, 19 December 2008, p. 7.  
22 See the speeches made at the second Joint Committee meeting, CEFTA Chairmanship of 
Montenegro 2009, ‘CEFTA 2006 Joint Committee’, op.cit. 
23 SEE.market, ‘CEFTA Progress?’, B92, 10 July 2008, retrieved 28 April 2009, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/opinions.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&nav_id=51802. 
24 T h e r e  i s  n o  d a t a  o n  U N M I K / K o s o v o .  W o r l d  B a n k ,  Quick Query Selected from World 
Development Indicators, retrieved 27 April 2009, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/ 
member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135.  
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(in % of GDP) increased in all countries (exports remained equal in Croatia) in 2007. 
Yet, a more significant rise in the share of exports in GDP is needed for substantial 
export-led growth. FDI net inflows increased substantially from 2006 to 2007 in all 
countries except FYROM. The figures for 2008 should be considered cautiously as a 
negative impact of the global financial and economic crisis is likely. Increasingly, 
there is FDI also from within the region.25 However, overall trade deficits deteriorated 
until 2008. We can conclude that the overall economic situation of the participating 
countries improved slightly.  
 
As regards the concrete provisions of the agreement, it can be observed that 
they have mostly been implemented, even though the early stage of the integration 
process implies that it is mainly analyses carried out and action plans established for 
future liberalisation. This stage of rather procedural decisions (such as establishing 
sub-committees, rules of procedures, and the secretariat) is rather uncontroversial. At 
the Joint Committee meetings in 2007 and 2008, Prime and Trade Ministers made 
quite optimistic statements, displaying high commitment to regional integration and 
liberalisation. However, there is increasing criticism that political will is lacking when it 
comes to substantial issues, as illustrated by the planned imposition of duties on 
agricultural imports by Bosnia and Herzegovina26 and the perceived increase in 
administrative burdens. 
 
Concerning the political effects of CEFTA 2006, difficulties can be found in the 
first of our categories of analysis, practice international cooperation, both on the 
intergovernmental and supranational level. Although meetings are held regularly on 
all levels and decisions are adopted, accessible for the public as well as on schedule 
with the agreement’s provisions, it is less certain whether CEFTA 2006 fosters 
cooperative behaviour and reduces tensions among the participants. It is relatively 
easy to produce positive political statements when the issues at stake are not yet in 
the implementation phase. As illustrated by the dispute on BiH’s import duties on 
agricultural products, it seems that cooperative behaviour is not yet achieved. In 
several documents, also the status of UNMIK/Kosovo is mentioned as a potential risk 
                                                 
25 S. Kathuria (ed.), Western Balkan Integration and the EU: An Agenda for Trade and Growth, 
Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2008, p. 77.  
26 In April 2009, BiH considered to re-impose full customs on agricultural imports from Croatia 
and Serbia to protect local farmers. S. Latal, ‘Bosnia Risks Violating CEFTA Trade Agreement’, 
BalkanInsight.com, 28 April 2009, retrieved 28 April 2009, http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/ 
news/18473. 
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to the smooth functioning of CEFTA 2006 as regards participation of UNMIK/Kosovo in 
the committees.27 An additional factor hindering successful implementation of CEFTA 
2006 are understaffed and under-resourced national administrations.28 There is no 
delegation of sovereignty to the secretariat as it has only a supporting function. As to 
regional ownership and commitment, indicated by the regional budget, the 
participants follow up their commitments and contribute to the secretariat’s 
budget.29 Interestingly though, the Secretariat’s Outline Strategic Work Programme 
2008-2011 mentions that “[t]here is a risk that despite their formal agreement some 
CEFTA Parties may not transfer funds to the Secretariat”.30 
 
Concerning the second category of political effects,  training ground for 
accession, there is a mixed record. On the one hand, we expect that regular 
institutionalised meetings in the CEFTA committees familiarise the participants with 
recurrent consensus-based decision-making. However, political tensions in the region 
often prevent the cooperative behaviour that would be needed for decision-making 
in EU Council structures. We also note that the participants’ different stages of pre-
accession influence their attitude towards regional integration. Especially Croatia as 
being most advanced towards EU membership is suspected to perceive CEFTA 2006 
merely as a ‘waiting room’ and therefore not committed to regional liberalisation.31 
In the following, we will take a closer look at the impact of the accession perspective 
on the success of CEFTA 2006 and on the EU’s support for it. 
 
3.2.2 Assessment of the EU’s Success in Promoting CEFTA 2006 
As only two of the Western Balkan countries obtained candidate status and one is 
not even an official ‘potential candidate’, EU membership is still a very distant and 
vague project for most of the participants. Regional cooperation in trade matters 
spilled over into formal political cooperation, but did not yet lead to a real reduction 
in political tensions. Here, the EU might be caught in a ‘vicious circle’ as tangible 
economic benefits from the RTA increase incentives for political cooperation but at 
the same time, the political will of Western Balkan leaders to cooperate is needed to 
realise these economic benefits. As regional cooperation has become a de facto 
                                                 
27 CEFTA Secretariat, CEFTA Secretariat Work Programme 2009, February 2009, p. 9.  
28 See for BiH: EU TPP (Support Trade Policy Development and Capacity Building in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), Trade Related Needs Assessment Report, Sarajevo, November 2007, p. 40. 
29 CEFTA Secretariat, op.cit., p. 2.  
30 CEFTA Secretariat, Outline Strategic Work Programme 2008-2011, October 2008, p. 9. 
31 SEE.market, op.cit. 
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accession condition, CEFTA 2006 participants do not really have a choice but have 
to cooperate at least formally in the established institutions: “The EC repeatedly 
made it clear in the Working Group that a regional free trade area in SEE [South 
Eastern Europe] is a key part of the process of European integration. Regional free 
trade and the SAAs [Stabilisation and Association Agreements] were to be the two 
legs for a country in SEE to walk on its approach to Europe.”32  
 
As illustrated above, political will to implement provisions of the agreement 
decreases when national producers face increased regional competition. As 
nationalism is still a prevalent feature of politics in the region, further defections may 
be expected. As to the objective of providing a ‘training ground for EU accession’, 
we can thus state that CEFTA 2006 participants become familiar with the formalities 
of regional cooperation. The aspects of ‘creating solidarity’ and ‘fostering 
cooperative behaviour’ are not (yet) achieved. The bilateral SAAs remain the most 
important framework for Western Balkan countries and the EU uses them to influence 
political decisions (such as support to pro-European forces in the Serbian election in 
spring 2008 by signing the SAA; and police reform as condition for the signature of 
the SAA with BiH). Also, access to EU markets is still more important as most trade is still 
carried out with the EU and not within the region. Nevertheless, a training ground for 
EU accession is provided in the sense of an adoption of parts of the acquis and 
interaction with the EU through its support measures. 
 
Concerning development as one of the EU’s economic objectives, it is yet too 
early to state whether CEFTA 2006 leads to increased prosperity (see above). Should 
all provisions of CEFTA 2006 be implemented as foreseen, there is little justification to 
expect negative consequences on the participating economies once they have 
adapted to increased competition. Support to CEFTA 2006 is an adequate 
instrument to pursue regulatory power as the agreement includes several references 
to harmonisation of EU rules and standards. The EU’s overall support for CEFTA 2006 is 
an adequate vehicle to further implementation of these harmonisation measures. 
Concrete EU support directly impacts on rules and standards in the form of technical 
assistance to the relevant sub-committees. As stated in the programming fiche for 
IPA assistance to CEFTA 2006, the EU firstly supports studies to identify in which areas 
technical assistance is necessary. Again, the most concrete support for 
                                                 
32 P.M. Wijkman, op.cit., p. 3. 
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harmonisation with EU rules and standards will be carried out under the national IPA 
projects. As regards commercial diplomacy and market access, the EU can be 
expected to be successful once Western Balkan countries proceed closer towards 
accession. Through support for investment-related projects in the framework of 
CEFTA 2006, the EU contributes to the improvement of the investment climate for 
European companies. As mentioned above, the objective of competition is of rather 
minor importance and already achieved with the Western Balkan countries decision 
to pursue integration with the EU.  
 
When looking at the IPA support programme, it becomes clear that the focus 
is on financial and technical assistance that has already proved its value in the 
2004/07 accession rounds. Again, the underlying logic is that once the technical 
details work, economic benefits emerge and the political will for cooperation 
increases. The three components of IPA assistance (funding to the secretariat; 
assessment of trade flows and investment environment; and technical assistance for 
the sub-committees) are thoroughly planned and expected results and indicators 
stated, so that we expect the foreseen measures to be carried out and to contribute 
significantly to the overall functioning of the technical aspects of CEFTA 2006. 
Problems might arise for the Commission’s evaluation of these measures as its 
indicators do not always distinguish between the functioning of CEFTA 2006 or the 
secretariat as such and the concrete EU contribution to it. As the projects only 
started to be implemented recently, it is too early to draw conclusions on their 
success at this point.  
 
Overall, the EU’s focus on financial and technical assistance is adequate as it 
builds on expertise acquired through its own process of regionalisation and 
accession assistance. The EU will probably achieve its goals but in combination with 
bilateral accession assistance and SAA conditionality. As to the political tensions in 
the region, there is little that an external actor can do more than apply pressure for 
dialogue and concentrate on technical cooperation in uncontroversial areas. 
 
4. Case II: The Agadir Agreement 
On the whole, it seems that the EU exerted critical external influence for the creation 
of the Agadir Agreement. Working groups were established by the Euro-Med trade 
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ministers to assist in preparing the RTA.33 The EU is in general the most important 
trading partner, leading to ‘hub-and-spoke’ patterns without “generalized and 
substantial trade flows between the ‘spokes’”.34  
 
As a basis, the agreement mentions explicitly “the bonds of Arab brother-
hood” and “the strong relationships existing between [the parties]”.35 The EU is only 
mentioned in the penultimate recital. The application of Pan-Euro-Med RoOs is 
foreseen36. In general, the Agadir Agreement is less specific than CEFTA 2006 and 
does neither include concrete target dates for revision or negotiations on further 
liberalisation nor a general evolution clause. Moreover, provisions on e.g. 
government procurement and financial transactions are weaker than those of CEFTA 
2006, not only because of their unspecificity, but also because laws and procedures 
of each participant can be used as justification for non-implementation.37 While 
some deeper integration issues are included, provisions remain vague, increasing the 
risk of diverging interpretations. As to the institutional structure, a Foreign Ministers’ 
Committee, a Committee of Foreign Trade Ministers, a Technical Committee and a 
secretariat (the Amman-based Agadir Technical Unit, ATU) have been established.38 
 
4.1 EU Support for the Agadir Agreement – Objectives and Instruments  
While South-South integration is one condition for the establishment of the Euro-Med 
FTA, the underlying motivation of support to the Agadir Agreement is of political 
nature. In the words of then Commissioner Patten, regional integration is “an 
instrument of economic growth – and ultimately, […] an instrument of political 
                                                 
33 A. Bayar, ‘An Evaluation of the Benefits and the Challenges of the South-South Integration 
among the Mediterranean Partner Countries’, FEMISE Research Network 2004-2005, Marseille, 
2006, p. 16.; S. Neaime, South-South Trade Monetary and Financial Integration and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: An Empirical Investigation, FEMISE Research Network 2004-2005, 
Marseille, June 2005, p. 12. 
34 G. Escribano & J.M. Jordan, ‘Sub-regional Integration in the MENA Region and the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 14, no. 2, 1999, p. 135.  
35 Agadir Agreement, Recital 2.  
36 Relevant for our analysis is diagonal cumulation (the RTA participants adopt common ROOs 
so that a product does not lose its origin status when it crosses borders within the RTA). R. 
Baldwin, S. Evenett & P. Low, ‘Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralising Deeper RTA Commitments’, 
Paper presented at WTO-HEI Conference on “Multilateralising Regionalism”, 10-12 September 
2007, Geneva, p. 3. 
37 See e.g. Art. 11 and 13, Agadir Agreement. There is however a provision on joint exhibitions 
(Art. 14 of the agreement). 
38 Agadir Agreement, Art. 24-28. 
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cooperation and peace”.39 By supporting the Agadir Agreement, the EU sends a 
signal to all MPCs concerning the importance of regional cooperation and 
contributes to the spread of its own rules and norms. Commercial diplomacy and 
market access are objectives, too, as the Agadir Agreement creates a market of 
around 120 million consumers40 and opportunities for international supply chains.41 
This directly links with competition as despite the Agadir countries’ current trade 
orientation towards the EU, they concluded several bilateral FTAs, inter alia with the 
US and are potentially attractive markets not only for European companies. 
 
As with CEFTA 2006, the EU supports the Agadir Agreements generally 
(illustrated for example by the Euro-Med Trade Ministers’ meetings and by the 
presence of the External Relations Commissioner during the signing ceremony as well 
as of the Trade Commissioner at the First Agadir Investment Forum in April 200842) and 
through financial and technical assistance. Aid is channelled through the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which provides funding for 
institution building (support to the ATU), regional trade facilitation (e.g. training 
activities) and awareness rising and promotion activities.43 The Commission 
Delegation in Amman manages the contractual and financial aspects of the grant. 
 
4.2 Assessment 
4.2.1 Effects of the Agadir Agreement as Such 
As regards the overall economic situation of the Agadir countries, “[t]he first year of 
implementation of the Agadir Agreement […] has shown so far mitigated results in 
terms of increase of trade flows amongst the partners”.44 Regarding the attraction of 
FDI, the Agadir Agreement did until now not fulfil expectations.45 In 2007, FDI inflows 
                                                 
39 C. Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, ‘Speech on the Occasion of the 
Signature of the Agadir Agreement’, Agadir, Morocco, 25 February 2004, p. 1. 
40 Commission, DG External Relations, ‘Commissioner Patten attends signature of Agadir 
Agreement’, Press Release, Brussels, 24 February 2008, p. 1.  
41 Interview #1: Interview with an official, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels, 5 
February 2009. 
42 S. Wippel, The Agadir Agreement and Open Regionalism, EuroMeSCo Paper, no. 45, Lisbon, 
September 2005, p. 9. 
43 Interview #6: Interview by e-mail with an official, Commission Delegation to Jordan, 13 April 
2009. 
44 Partenariat EuroMed, ‘Chairman’s Conclusions’, 7th EuroMed Trade Ministerial Conference, 
Marseille, 2 July 2008, p. 2.  
45 P. Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, ‘Agadir and after: Prospects for a Free Trade Area of 
the Mediterranean’, First Agadir Investment Forum, Brussels, 8 April 2008, p. 2.  
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decreased as compared to 2006 in Jordan and Tunisia.46 The available data on 
trade balances illustrate significant deficits in all Agadir countries and real GDP 
growth decreased from in 2007 in Egypt and Morocco.47  
 
Concerning the provisions on traditional liberalisation issues, the 
implementation of the Agadir Agreement did not start smoothly. Already in the very 
beginning, tariff dismantling was late due to the delay of entry into force of the 
agreement.48 Agriculture still generates significant parts of GDP in three of the Agadir 
countries, but the agreement does not go beyond GAFTA provisions and for some 
products, trade is even more liberalised with the EU than among Agadir countries. 
Provisions on  new trade issues are in general rather vague and do not include 
concrete target dates for revision or further liberalisation. Since there are no 
documents publicly available on the work of the Agadir institutional bodies, we 
cannot make any statements on progress in implementation. Liberalisation of trade 
in services is proceeding in the framework of GATS, while there are no concrete 
provisions on investment and the provisions on competition, state aid and 
government procurement remain vague, and it is unclear what has really been 
implemented so far. Concerning the operating rules, RoOs have received most 
attention so far. The agreement foresees the application of the Pan-Euro-Med RoOs. 
There is no data yet on the extent to which they are used.49 While adoption of the 
required customs procedures is positive,50 different RoOs apply under GAFTA to 
which the Agadir countries are also parties.51 The Agadir Agreement has also been 
praised for its provisions on harmonisation of regulation and co-ordination of policies 
in several areas.52 However, these provisions (which are only referred to in one 
recital) remain so vague that it is not clear how coordination will proceed or if they 
are actually implemented. In general, we can conclude that it is not likely that the 
agreement will lead to deep integration because it does not cover important 
aspects such as services and investments. In addition, there are no publicly 
                                                 
46 UNCTAD Country Fact Sheets, retrieved 10 March 2009, http://www.unctad.org/ 
Templates/Page.asp?intitemID=2441&lang=1.  
47 Author’s own compilation based on European Commission, DG Trade, Economic Fiches, 
retrieved 10 March 2009, 2008, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_search.cfm? 
action=search. 
48 S. Wippel, op.cit., pp. 16-17. 
49 Interview #1  
50 Commission, Action Fiche for the ENPI Southern Region, op.cit., p. 8.  
51 S. Wippel, op.cit., p. 19.  
52 Ibid., p. 17.  
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accessible documents by the committees established under the agreement and the 
ATU’s website is still rudimentary.  
 
As to the political effects of the RTA, only the first category, practice 
international cooperation, is relevant here due to the lack of a membership 
perspective. While there are meetings on the intergovernmental level, these are 
barely visible and bilateral channels are sometimes used more frequently.53 
Moreover, the Agadir Agreement’s membership structure already recognised 
political tensions in the region.54 Cooperative tendencies are visible among the 
current members concerning the reduction of competitive structures (e.g. in the 
automobile sector).55 There are no signs of political cooperation beyond concrete 
sectors yet. As regards the supranational level, the first potential political effect of 
practicing the delegation of sovereignty has been partly realised as the ATU has 
been successfully established. While the Agadir process is still dominantly 
intergovernmental and conflicts are, if at all, dealt with in the Foreign Trade Ministers’ 
Committee, the ATU achieved concrete progress in the form of studies and the 
organisation of events such as the Agadir Investment Forum. As to local commitment 
and ownership, indicated by an adequate regional budget, Agadir countries so far 
complied with their funding commitments to the ATU but there are fears that they 
might not continue to do so.56 
 
4.2.2 Assessment of the EU’s Success in Promoting CEFTA 2006 
While the EU position is that economic integration precedes political cooperation, 
Mediterranean representatives stated that political conditions should ameliorate first. 
As this implies that there would be no progress in the short- to medium-term, the EU 
rejects this view.57 The often-faced dilemma between democratisation/political 
reforms and stability also applies in the case of the Agadir Agreement: on the one 
hand, regional economic integration is e x p e c t e d  t o  l e a d  t o  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p -
ment, thereby increasing the pressure for political domestic reforms. On the other 
hand, economic (and following political) reforms could in the short term lead to 
                                                 
53 A. Maazouz, ‘L’image du Maroc à l’épreuve des faits’, Jeune Afrique, 11 January 2009, 
retrieved 10 March 2009, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAJA2504p084-
085.xml0_. 
54 E.g. Algeria is not a member, also due to conflicts with Morocco.   
55 A. Maazouz, op.cit. 
56 Commission, Action Fiche for the ENPI Southern Region, op.cit., p. 7. 
57 Interview #1 
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social instability due to increased competition among companies and restructuring 
of economies and thereby to regime instability, which is at least a short-term threat 
to EU security. At this first stage of economic integration, we do, however, not expect 
negative impact on the stability of governments in the region. The Agadir 
Agreement could rather be seen “as an avant-garde initiative bringing together the 
Arab world states that introduced economic reforms relatively early and with a 
comparative degree of earnestness”.58 Since “the Agadir countries are also 
regarded as an ‘example’ of economic co-operation to other Arab countries”,59 the 
EU’s efforts to promote a form of regional economic integration based upon its own 
model seem to be successful at least in this first stage. Although the EU cannot offer 
the ‘carrot’ of membership, the prospects of increased market access, inter alia 
through the application of the Pan-Euro-Med RoOs, seem to render regional 
economic integration in the Southern neighbourhood possible. Again, the EU refers 
to its own integration history when locating its role in this process: “The important 
principle is that reforms must be owned by the countries in the region themselves, 
even if helped by others. In the same manner that when the EU embarked on the 
process of reforms years ago we did so under our own ownership, even if helped by 
others.”60  
 
The EU’s broader objective of exporting its model for regionalisation is in a very 
first stage of focusing on technical cooperation. This focus is adequate as illustrated 
firstly by the failure of several political regional cooperation projects in the region 
and secondly by concrete, if still limited, results. In the words of then Commissioner 
Mandelson, “[t]he EU’s financial and technical support for the Technical Unit is 
important, but the political ownership has to belong to the Agadir member States 
[sic]. I am very pleased to see that such a sense of ownership is growing.”61  
 
With a view to the EU’s economic objectives, it is yet too early to draw 
conclusions about the overall growth and development benefits of the Agadir 
Agreement (development objective). Yet, the formal condition of having RTAs in 
                                                 
58 S. Wippel, op.cit., p. 19. 
59 Ibid., p. 24.  
60 C. Patten, op.cit., p. 3.  
61 P. Mandelson, op.cit., p. 3.  
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place before the Euro-Med FTA will be established starts to be fulfilled.62 Currently, a 
Euro-Med Trade Roadmap until 2010 and beyond is prepared for presentation at the 
December 2009 Euro-Med Trade Ministerial.63 It can be expected that regulatory 
harmonisation will take a prominent place in this document.64 However, as in the 
case of the Western Balkans, harmonisation of rules and standards is however mainly 
pursued under the bilateral association agreements.65 Currently, bilateral 
Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Accreditation are negotiated on the 
Euro-Med level. Also, negotiations on liberalisation of services have been launched 
with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.66 On the inter-regional level, the EU successfully 
promotes the Pan-Euro-Med scheme of cumulation through technical support to the 
ATU. Still, differing schemes in the region might backfire in terms of lost trade benefits 
and negative consequences for growth and, eventually, the EU’s security. The 
easiest way to achieve the application of Pan-Euro-Med RoOs would be to 
conclude a single regional convention.67 The ‘carrot’ of increased market access is 
particularly relevant for agricultural products. As illustrated above, the EU successfully 
pursues regulatory expansion in the field of sanitary and phyotsanitary standards as 
MPCs must comply with EU standards if they want to increase their exports. The 
achievements in the field of market access are promising and include concrete 
initiatives to establish business-to-business contacts such as the First Agadir 
Investment Forum.68 As increased knowledge in the business community about the 
Agadir countries and awareness rising are objectives pursued through ENPI support 
to the ATU, this part of EU support is quite successful. It is expected that the ATU will 
produce information about the investment climate in the Agadir countries (in 
cooperation with other Community programmes such as Invest in Med etc.). The 
assistance under ENPI is adequate to that end. Support to the ATU is also successful 
as concrete studies were produced with EU assistance that may serve as basis for the 
coordination of economic policies in specific sectors. ENPI programmes are in 
                                                 
62 Even if the target date of 2010 is very unlikely to be reached. However, the date has been 
kept to maintain pressure for reforms in the MPCs.  
63 Partenariat EuroMed, op.cit., p. 5.  
64 Commission, Euromed Ministers strengthen Euro-Mediterranean trade and investment 
relations beyond 2010, Press Release, IP/09/1890, 8 December 2009.  
65 E. Lannon, ‘Towards a Union for the Mediterranean: Progress and Challenges in Economic 
and Trade Relations’, Briefing Paper, Policy Department External Policies, Committee on 
International Trade, European Parliament, September 2008, p. 3.  
66 Ibid., p. 9.  
67 Interview #1 
68 J. Smith, ‘First Agadir Member States Investment Forum a Major Step for Euro-Med 
Integration’,  Business Intelligence Middle East, 26 March 2008, retrieved 28 April 2009, 
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general not as detailed as IPA provisions because non-candidates do not have to 
implement the acquis which enables a higher degree of local ownership in the 
projects and  avoids the impression that the EU imposes its will on its neighbours.  
 
Through its pronounced support for the Agadir Agreement, the EU has 
established itself successfully as influential actor concerning competition for 
regulatory standard-setting and market access. Its distinct inter-regional approach 
distinguishes it from the rather bilateral approach pursued by the US, and its 
concentration on technical features of economic cooperation is more promising 
than political regional integration initiatives in the Southern Mediterranean.  
 
5. Comparison and Conditions for Success  
There are similarities and differences regarding the respective contexts of the 
creation of the two RTAs. Both are located in the EU’s neighbourhood, but in different 
geographic regions. Also, while CEFTA 2006 is a ‘regional’ grouping in that it includes 
all the countries from the Western Balkans, the Agadir Agreement includes only four 
of the MPCs which do not even share common borders. The main difference is, 
however, the EU membership perspective for most of the CEFTA 2006 parties. 
Although this has implications for almost every aspect of the relation between the EU 
and the RTAs, it does not determine the EU’s success as the objectives are different. 
  
Regarding the content of the agreements, the Agadir Agreement is less 
specific and does not include target dates for revision or further negotiations on 
liberalisation. This makes the Agadir Agreement’s implementation more dependent 
on political will to deepen integration and also complicates its assessment. Our 
findings indicate that intergovernmental cooperation is more effective in terms of 
concrete working plans, negotiations on further liberalisation and overall progress in 
integration in CEFTA 2006 than in the Agadir Agreement.  
 
Concerning inter-regional relations, the relevant meetings between EU and 
Agadir officials and ministers are those in the EMP framework (e.g. Euro-
Mediterranean Trade Ministerials) as the Agadir Agreement is just a step on the way 
to an overall Arab Mediterranean FTA and then a Euro-Mediterranean FTA. By 
contrast, there are no regular institutionalised EU-Western Balkans trade minsters’ 
meetings. Here, the accession perspective probably plays a role, as the creation of a 
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regional ‘counterpart’ to EU trade ministers might not be suitable for future relations 
within an enlarged EU. Inter-regional relations are in both cases accompanied by 
bilateral relations that are, at least by the third countries, perceived as more 
important. For the Agadir countries, this is illustrated by efforts to reach more 
favourable and far-reaching bilateral relations with the EU such as through 
Morocco’s statut avancé. An opinion poll in Morocco came to the conclusion that, 
while Morocco wishes to have friendly and cooperative relations to its neighbours in 
the region, a ‘partnership’ is reserved for the EU.69 Also CEFTA 2006 participants know 
that their individual accession prospects depend on their progress in meeting the 
accession criteria – of which regional integration is only one.  
 
The accession perspective also impacts on the export of norms and values by 
the EU. This aspect of support to RTAs seems to be less acute in the Western Balkans 
as these countries are already committed to adopt EU values through accession. On 
the contrary, the MPCs are in general not as committed to further peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law and human rights – although the Agadir group do consist of 
the most advanced reformers in the region. EU support to the Agadir Agreement 
here also serves to illustrate that reforms are rewarded and thereby may convince 
other MPCs to join this path. In addition, the EU is the sole external donor to the 
Agadir Agreement and indirect co-initiator, while CEFTA 2006 has been established 
out of a much broader international context even though the EU has a dominant 
role. This implies that the stakes are higher for the EU in the Agadir Agreement. The 
membership perspective of the Western Balkan countries also impacts on the issue of 
market access for EU companies and competition with other external actors. Again, 
the MPCs are not future ‘EU territory’ and competition is still going on, as illustrated by 
the increasing number of bilateral FTAs (e.g. with the US). This is reflected in more 
visible concrete investment promotion activities in the Mediterranean supported by 
the EU (e.g. the Agadir Investment Forum) and an emphasis on business contacts 
with EU companies. The EU’s support programmes are also managed differently: in 
the case of CEFTA 2006, Commission officials in Brussels centrally manage EU support 
and also the secretariat is located there. This is more appropriate as preparation for 
EU accession is the ultimate goal, so closeness to EU structures in Brussels is crucial. In 
contrast, the Commission Delegation in the region carries out support to the Agadir 
                                                 
69 L. Martinez et al., Le Maroc, l’Union du Maghreb Arabe et l’intégration régionale, 
EuroMeSCo Paper, no. 67, Lisbon, May 2008, p. 6. 
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Agreement. For the Southern Mediterranean context, this is more appropriate as the 
impression must be avoided that the Agadir Agreement has been imposed upon the 
participants by an external actor. Concerning the secretariats of the RTAs, there is 
already a difference in the names. The CEFTA 2006 Secretariat is called ‘secretariat’, 
while ‘Agadir Technical Unit’ emphasises the limited role it has. This is to be explained 
by general reservations towards supranational structures in the MPCs, whereas the 
Western Balkans will have to submit their trade policy to Community rules eventually. 
The strong de facto influence of the EU on the Agadir Agreement is illustrated by two 
EU technical experts working in the ATU, while there is only ‘regional’ staff in the 
CEFTA 2006 Secretariat. In the concrete support programmes, the provisions on IPA 
projects are in general more specific than those on ENPI projects (for example in 
terms of expected results and measureable indicators). This can again be explained 
by the membership perspective since candidate countries will have to implement 
the very detailed provisions of the acquis and will undergo thorough monitoring 
processes.  
 
From these findings we can derive a condition for the successful exportation 
of the EU model of regionalisation (to be complemented with case-specific aspects): 
there must be political willingness and commitment on the part of third countries to 
accept EU norms and values, be it due to material benefits (benefits of regional 
economic integration outweigh costs) or normative considerations. Also, political 
tensions must not be too high to prevent any form of cooperation which illustrates 
the importance of the membership structure of an RTA.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper analysed the promotion of regional economic integration by the EU. The 
findings of our two case studies indicate that the EU pursues different political 
objectives through its support for RTAs, providing support on a more general political 
level and through concrete financial and technical assistance programme. Having a 
membership perspective influences the EU’s objectives and their relative importance 
as well as the choice of the concrete external assistance programmes. However, the 
EU is not necessarily more successful in promoting regional economic integration 
among (potential) candidate countries as illustrated above.  
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Overall, it is not yet clear whether regional economic integration in the form of 
the two RTAs will yield the expected economic benefits and thus contribute to 
political cooperation. To what extent regional integration in the EU’s neighbourhood 
can be a panacea for the prevailing problems will have to be assessed once the full 
effects of the RTAs can be observed. As regards the Southern neighbourhood, the 
creation of strong bonds requires also the participation of all MPCs in the RTA.  
 
Hence, does the EU possess the ‘magic formula’ for promoting regional 
integration? Our findings suggest that the EU is at least quite convinced of its own 
model of regional integration that started with economic cooperation in limited 
sectors and spilled over to political integration. The EU promotes this model rather 
actively, also through a focus on support for regional institutions set up by RTAs to 
demonstrate the value of supranational bodies. As our analysis of EU support to the 
Agadir Agreement indicates, the EU can also successfully promote regional 
economic integration without offering membership if it offers strong incentives and if 
political tensions in the region concerned are not too high, that is if the RTA in 
question has an adequate membership structure. Here, it should be kept in mind that 
RTAs may be artificially constructed entities and not ‘regions’ in the sense of broader 
political cooperation or even the appearance of a regional identity (that is, forms of 
second or even third generation regionalism).  
 
The EU ultimately aims at exporting its core norms of peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law and human rights. As illustrated by our case studies, support 
to RTAs can contribute to this aim, however, it is not a guarantee for success as 
tangible benefits from regional economic integration are needed for spill-over 
effects into political cooperation. Eventually, geographical neighbours cannot be 
integrated through the EU but must have the political will for regional integration.  
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